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In that summer's fiercely fought campaign for president of the United States, both candidates-John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon-sought the black vote, and both worried about alienating white southern voters. The "solid South" no longer seemed so solidly Democratic, in no small measure due to the pressures the civil rights movement put on the long-standing structure of white rule in the region. In this extraordinarily close contest, some of Kennedy's advisers feared that explicit support for civil rights could cost them the election, while Nixon's strategists hoped they might win as many as six southern states. The campaigns needed ways to appeal to black voters without alienating the increasingly unsolid South.
Kennedy's decision to telephone Coretta Scott King on a late October day to offer sympathy for her jailed husband, reinforced by Robert Kennedy's subsequent call to help secure Martin Luther King Jr.'s release, has become the campaign's iconic event and a sto-Black Voters, Africa, and the 1960 Presidential Campaign duced the complexity of African American voting to an oversimplified equation: Kennedy called about King, so he won the black vote. Indeed, historical accounts of the election have neglected Kennedy's own emphases even as they have reduced black voters to men and women silently waiting for a phone call before they pulled the lever.
Perhaps most obscured has been Kennedy's attention to the Third World during the campaign and, in particular, his deliberate focus on Africa. Kennedy's interest in Africa was encouraged by black leaders who saw an opportunity to use the election's razor-thin closeness and a black voting population that seemed in play to prod both campaigns to greater action on issues of fundamental concern to black America-issues that in 1960 very much included Africa. Africa seemed on the rise that summer. From the end of the primaries to election day in November, more than a dozen African nations gained independence, and at the United Nations (un) that September, seventeen new members from the continent assembled. 5 With the confluence of African liberation struggles and the American civil rights movement, news about Africa filled the pages of the black press. The black diaspora supported African independence, a "Marshall Plan" of economic aid for Africa, expanded educational opportunities for Africans; even more, they wanted the nation's political leaders to support such opportunities as evidence that they supported civil rights in the United States. Senator Scott's heated charges of an unconstitutional takeover make sense given the backdrop of the day: Africa held real and symbolic importance to a black America whose votes were critical in a tight campaign.
Witnessing the powerful draw of Africa and the deep desire to improve lives there, during the campaign Kennedy referred to Africa hundreds of times-far more than he did to civil rights. For Kennedy, Africa was the newest frontier, one where he could burnish his Cold War credentials by enrolling newly independent states on the side of the West while making himself known as a candidate sympathetic to black Americans. The plight of the 280 African students provided Kennedy a welcome opportunity to promote the relatively noncontroversial program of improving African education while skirting the more problematic issue of just when independence from colonial rule should come in Africa. The need to enlist more black U.S. Foreign Service officers and the need to stop the Jim Crowing of African diplomats-thus resolving issues that created ill will in foreign relations as well as among black Americans at home-provided additional powerful themes for his campaign rhetoric and potent appeals to black Americans. With the Cold War at the forefront of most Americans' minds and equal treatment central to black voters, Kennedy adroitly used Africa to champion domestic black concerns in a foreign context. This episode, like others important to our expanding understanding of the relationship between the Cold War and civil rights, shows how the intertwining of the two reached into the most elemental aspects of American life-including choosing the nation's leader. 6 Looking beyond the King calls offers one final insight, for while Kennedy's use of Africa provides another telling example of his political opportunism, it also helps reveal his more deeply held beliefs. International affairs, the Cold War, Third World nationalism, and the demise of colonialism far outranked domestic civil rights as issues of interest to Kennedy, who genuinely appreciated the forces of nationalism and the desires for independence in the Third World and sought to steer America's relations with the broader world accordingly. It was no accident that Africa figured so prominently in his campaign speeches or that in the early months of his presidency Kennedy met with more African leaders than civil rights leaders, pushed harder for the Peace Corps than for civil rights legislation, and felt more comfortable with forces of nationalism than with activism for civil rights. The King phone call was a fleeting gesture; Africa was his interest and the place where he sought common ground with black America. The question for the candidates in 1960 was which way black voters were trending; intricately tied to it was which way white voters in the South were heading. In 1952 Stevenson had managed to carry just nine states, all below the Mason-Dixon line. In 1956 he had lost three of those (Louisiana, Kentucky, and West Virginia) while picking up only Black Voters, Africa, and the 1960 Presidential Campaign Missouri. Heading into the final weeks of the 1960 campaign, the South was in play, with most states apparently up for grabs. Gallup polling results based on interviews conducted a month before election day revealed a 47-46 percent lead for the Richard M. NixonHenry Cabot Lodge ticket among voters registered or planning to register in the South, while outside the South the John F. Kennedy-Lyndon B. Johnson ticket held a 50-45 percent lead. If those divisions held, one hundred years after Abraham Lincoln's election and the coming of the Civil War, the result would be unprecedented: The Republican candidate would run strongest in the South, and the Democratic candidate strongest elsewhere. "The South is torn this fall, possibly as never before, between old Democratic loyalties and new Republican leanings," began a Wall Street Journal analysis headed "Dixie's Indecision" published just weeks before the election. "Surprising numbers of Southerners find themselves still searching their souls to reach a decision." 9 How to secure black votes while not alienating southern white voters became a delicate yet critical balancing act for the candidates. Positions on civil rights were fraught with deep meaning and held enormous implications for the campaigns. Notwithstanding the disturbing racial views revealed on his White House tapes, Nixon stood as something of a racial liberal in the Eisenhower administration. Perhaps his biggest political liability on civil rights was his association with that very administration; by 1960 most black voters believed it had failed to lead a strong enough charge for civil rights during its eight years in office. The Chicago Defender, perhaps the nation's leading black newspaper, summed up the Eisenhower record this way: "[It] has nothing to recommend it to posterity. It matters little how much the President waxes in eloquence on that point, he will never be able to blot out the glaring, colossal blunders of his Administration." 10 Yet Nixon himself had offered stronger support, becoming the administration's leading spokesman on civil rights. Nixon, who while still a congressman had been granted honorary membership by a local chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (naacp), was one of the few administration officials to endorse the Brown v. Board of Education decision, had energetically supported the Civil Rights Act of 1957, and had chaired the President's Committee on Government Contracts, which investigated charges of racial discrimination in federally related employment and sponsored educational campaigns in the business community to promote equal opportunity. Then, with prodding from his rival, New York governor Nelson Rockefeller, at the gop convention in July 1960 Nixon used his influence as the nominee to strengthen the Republican civil rights plank so it largely matched the one adopted earlier by the Democratic convention.
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On the other side, Kennedy offered no strong civil rights record, as most biographers have noted. In the wake of his failed bid for the vice presidential nomination at the 1956 Democratic National Convention, Kennedy in fact strove to bolster his standing among powerful southern Democrats by steering a ruthlessly political course, seeking, in the words of Robert Dallek, "a strategy for accommodating all factions of the Democrat party on civil rights." Doing so left Kennedy at best equivocating on the 1957 civil rights bill, at worst pandering to his party's most extreme segregationist elements. His meetings and Since his three-week tour of Africa in 1957, highlighted by his attendance at Ghana's independence celebrations in March, Nixon had become convinced that the continent was a Cold War battlefield that needed more American attention. "The course of [Africa's] development, as its people continue to emerge from a colonial status and assume the responsibilities of independence and self-government," Nixon advised, "could well prove to be the decisive factor in the conflict between forces of freedom and international communism." Given this significance, he advocated the deployment of more resources and better-trained personnel to the continent. He detailed a series of recommendations for U.S. policy: The Defense Department and the International Cooperation Administration should give higher priority to their operations in Africa; the State Department should immediately strengthen its representation in Africa qualitatively and quantitatively; planning for diplomatic relations with the emerging African states should commence; and aid and information programs should be reviewed and revamped to gain the maximum political impact. Emphasizing the Communist threat throughout his report to the president, Nixon made clear his backing for U.S. actions that supported newly independent countries in order to "alleviate the conditions of want and instability on which communism breeds."
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Within months Robert Cutler, special assistant to the president for national security affairs, was calling Nixon the "father" of a new African policy. While no dramatic policy changes took place, Nixon brought Africa into the conversation and supported creating the separate Bureau of African Affairs in the State Department to give the continent greater attention. Even as Nixon geared up his presidential campaign, he was in National Security Council (nsc) meetings declaring his obsession with Africa and, though there were two recently completed nsc papers on the continent, pushing for more attention while the Eisenhower team was still in office. 15 Like Nixon, Kennedy found himself engaging Africa in the late 1950s. A few months after the vice president returned from the continent, Kennedy stood before the Senate to make a major speech on the Algerian crisis that provided him a platform on which he built a reputation as a friend to African peoples seeking freedom from colonialism. "The most powerful single force in the world today is neither communism nor capitalism, neither the H-bomb nor the guided missile," declared Kennedy, "it is man's eternal desire to be free and independent. The great enemy of that tremendous force of freedom is called, for want of a more precise term, imperialism-and today that means Soviet imperialism and, whether we like it or not, and though they are not to be equated, Western imperialism." Urging both Paris and Washington to recognize the powerful tide of nationalism, he encouraged both governments to adjust their policies accordingly. If the United States was to secure the friendship of Africans, Arabs, and Asians, Kennedy concluded, the strength of the appeal must lie "in our traditional and deeply felt philosophy of freedom and independence for all peoples everywhere." The speech resulted in sharp criticism from the French government of Charles de Gaulle and the Eisenhower administration, but it secured Kennedy a reputation for sympathy with the emerging Third World. 16 Kennedy's concern about African independence, part of a long-standing interest in colonialism and nationalism, was political more than moral: colonialism's demise was a stark reality to face, not a moral policy to pursue. In many respects this viewpoint mirrored his position on civil rights. Yet the lack of interest in Africa by his fellow senators, even in the face of the continent's rapidly changing circumstances, meant that by May 1959 he was chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's new subcommittee on Africa. While the subcommittee rarely met, Kennedy used the position to political advantage in public appearances and speeches. At any likely opportunity he mentioned his chairmanship as a way to advance his profile in foreign affairs and to highlight his connection to Africa and the Third World. By late 1959 he had crafted the general outline of his stump speech on Africa, in which he spoke sympathetically about Africans' desires for a better standard of living and the opportunity to govern their own affairs. Like Nixon, Kennedy believed that America must make the political decision to assist Africa, arguing that taking such action would in turn aid the United States in a world where the balance of power was shifting "into the hands of the two-thirds of the world's people who want to share what the one-third has already taken for granted." He initially offered two main proposals: an "Educational Development Fund" that would emphasize the exchange of students, teachers, and trained personnel, thereby "opening our college doors to several times as many African students as now come over," and a multinational economic development fund to provide financial help for investment and development. Kennedy soon strengthened his emphasis on the Cold War threat posed by expanding Soviet inroads into Africa and added a proposal for food aid-to alleviate conditions of want pointed out by Nixon-to his program of education and capital, so by early 1960 he offered a comprehensive outline for working with Africa.
17
As Nixon and Kennedy focused attention on the Cold War struggle in Africa and rising Third World nationalism, interest in Africa was sweeping through other parts of America. The tide of African nationalism and the increasing influence of African liberation struggles flowed across the Atlantic Ocean to the diaspora in America, reinvigorating historic connections. The images of Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah leading the march toward Ghana's independence held deep meaning among black Americans; that he had graduated from the historically black Lincoln University in Pennsylvania generated even more pride and support. rather than colored people or Afro-Americans or 'Negroes' when such designation becomes necessary." When Nkrumah visited the United States in July 1958, palpable euphoria greeted him throughout black America. Over ten thousand people jammed the 369th aaa Group Armory in Harlem to celebrate Nkrumah, and there Ralph Bunche praised him for his leadership of Ghana and his inspiration to people of African descent everywhere.
We salute you because you are a true and living representation of our best hopes and ideals: of the determination we have to be accepted fully as equal beings, of the pride we have held and nurtured in our African origin, of the achievement of which we know we are capable given only opportunity, of the freedom in which we believe, of the dignity imperative to our stature as men. . . . But above all, Mr. Prime Minister, we embrace you because you and your people and we are brothers-brothers of the skin and brothers beneath the skin.
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Two nights later at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel a glittering crowd of politicians, diplomats, business executives, and black leaders gathered to honor Nkrumah. Lester Granger, executive secretary of the National Urban League, voiced what was on many people's minds: "Between Little Rock, Arkansas, and Accra, Ghana, 8,000 miles of land and sea stretch. But there is no more than the whisper of a bird's breath between the hopes and aspirations of the black citizens in Arkansas in the Deep South and the triumph and expectations of the black men and women of Ghana who walk the streets of Ghana tall and proud."
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With many drawing parallels and emphasizing links in the struggle for freedom and equality on both sides of the Atlantic, black leaders saw issues on which to press for action. On the broadest scale they sometimes called for a "Marshall Plan" for Africa. More regularly, though, specific issues drew support: more aid for African education and students; greater use of black Americans as diplomats in Africa; an end to Jim Crow treatment of African diplomats working at the un or at embassies in Washington; stronger U.S. backing of African independence. Those issues resonated in black America, reflecting the domestic struggle to end racial discrimination and gain fair economic opportunity.
Personalities and personal contacts further strengthened the mushrooming ties and mutual concerns. Rivaling Nkrumah for visibility in America was the Kenyan labor leader and politician Tom Mboya. Under the auspices of the American Committee on Africa (acoa), the charismatic Mboya first came to the United States in 1956, seeking to present a more positive image of Kenyans than the ones promulgated by the British during the Mau Mau war and hoping to build support for Kenyan independence. Mboya gave lectures, developed contacts with labor leaders, and sought aid for higher education for Kenyans. In April 1959 acoa sponsored him on another U.S. speaking tour, in which he gave close to one hundred speeches in thirty-seven days. While again seeking support for Kenyan nationalists, Mboya also hammered labor leaders and chatted up educational administrators about the desperate need for an educated class in a country rapidly moving Standing out among those who wanted to help were black Americans, who undertook significant efforts to help African students at a time when they themselves faced huge odds against going to college. In 1960, fewer than one in three adult black Americans had a high school diploma; more than 93 percent of 18-24-year-olds were not enrolled in college. Nevertheless, a growing number of men and women invested their time and money in helping African students gain access to American higher education.
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Even those with pressing demands on their time and resources helped the cause. Martin Luther King Jr., for example, kept up ongoing efforts to aid Kenyan students. When Mboya informed the civil rights leader that Tuskegee Institute had accepted the Kenyan student Nicholas Raballa, but that Raballa needed nearly $1,000 for expenses while at the school, King promised that his Dexter Avenue Baptist Church would provide half the needed money and his two-year-old civil rights organization, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (sclc), the other half. King also met and worked with Dr. Julius Gikonyo Kiano, an economics professor and future Kenyan government minister who accompanied Mboya on his 1959 trip. King happily informed the Kenyan of arrangements to provide $20 a month for two students' expenses and of his efforts to ascertain from other ministers what commitments they could offer. By the end of the year King wrote in high spirits that he had found enough support for five Kenyan students to study at Alabama State College. The Montgomery Improvement Association would provide for two students, King's congregation and Ralph Abernathy's First Baptist Church for one each, and a local club for one more. King held out hope that other local groups might make contracts to support three more students. King, increasingly engaged with African issues, in upcoming months sent out appeals for acoa's Africa Defense and Aid Fund and served again as honorary chairman of acoa's annual Africa Freedom Day. 23 Such positive responses helped convince Mboya and William X. Scheinman, an acoa board member and president of an aircraft hydraulic equipment company, to organize Black Voters, Africa, and the 1960 Presidential Campaign the African-American Students Foundation. So did direct encouragement from fellow labor leader A. Philip Randolph, who encouraged Mboya with his belief that "the Negro citizens of America are keenly interested in the success of this movement [to aid African students] because of our African roots." After some initial juggling, Frank C. Montero, a labor and public relations expert, became aasf president, Scheinman assumed the vice presidency, and Theodore W. Kheel, president of the National Urban League, became secretary-treasurer. Board members included the singer Harry Belafonte, the actor Sidney Poitier, Ralph Bunche's wife, Ruth Bunche, and the African nationalist leaders Mboya and Julius Nyerere. 24 In Nairobi Mboya and Kiano joined forces with a third Kenyan, Kariuki Njiiri, to identify Kenyan students who would form the nucleus of the first "African Airlift." They awarded scholarships to 39 students who, along with an almost equal number of candidates who had made private arrangements, filled the 81 seats available on the charter plane. Through a fund-raising effort headed by Belafonte, Poitier, and baseball legend Jackie Robinson, aasf raised $35,000 from eight thousand contributors for the trans- In its appeals for money, aasf had sought federal support, hoping to avoid the high cost of commercial carriers by using the government's Military Air Transport Service (mats). aasf recruited Rep. Charles Diggs, a Michigan Democrat and one of the nation's four black congressmen, knowing of his "keen interest in Africa and close personal relationship with Tom [Mboya]," to lobby the State Department to support the request. Yet during that 1959-1960 academic year just 219 African students studied on U.S. governmentfunded scholarships; a meager 34 more received partial aid. Fewer than 150 students from south of the Sahara received full support. William B. Macomber Jr., the assistant secretary for congressional relations in the State Department, informed Diggs that under existing regulations mats provided transportation to those not on official business only when no commercial transport was available, and even then costs had to be reimbursed. Further, lest Diggs think that the State Department had its own deep funding, the department planned for only 330 participants in educational exchanges from Africa for 1960, and privileging the aasf students would place an undue emphasis on Kenya. The U.S. government, despite being locked in a struggle for the hearts and minds of the world's people, had little assistance to offer Africans.
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The Cold War, Campaigns, and Africa: "An Index of Future Domestic and International Policies"
Both the Cold War and presidential politics had the ability to change the dynamics of any situation, and in 1960 both were present in full force. That summer the Cold War was in a particularly deep freeze; in May Soviet air defenses had shot down an American U-2 spy plane, and plans for a May summit meeting of the two nations' leaders then collapsed. The Cold War, at the very forefront of the Eisenhower administration's concerns, had by this time become inextricably bound up with the worldwide struggle against the color line. World War II had internationalized questions of race, and in the Cold War that followed, policy makers understood that racial discrimination in the United States affected the nation's ability to carry out its foreign policy abroad. As more and more African nations gained independence, the ill will generated by American racial discrimination had potentially damaging ramifications throughout the world's second-largest continent. Freedom struggles in Africa and Asia forced America's political leadership to deal with changing facts, and relations with the emerging nations took on heightened importance as the "free world" fought to contain Communism. While efforts to improve America's racial image were underway by the late 1940s, not until the 1960 election did both parties' candidates make the case that the United States should not just improve its racial policies and practices at home but also identify with the rising tide of nationalism and the emerging nations of the world.
Adding urgency to the situation, by 1960 Soviet leaders were making a stronger push for influence in Africa. They planned to more than double the number of African students studying in the Soviet Union from an estimated 350 in 1959-1960 to 775 in 1960-1961. Egypt sent by far the most students, but 76 came from Ghana, another 62 from Guinea, and a smattering of others from around the continent. As more and more nations became independent, the number of Africans able to go to the Soviet Union would only rise. In February 1960 Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev announced his country's intention to bring thousands of African, Asian, and Latin American students to study at the new Peoples' Friendship University in Moscow. A few months later even more disturbing scenarios plagued U.S. officials as the newly independent Congo plunged into chaos, and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba appealed to the Soviet Union for assistance. The thought of Soviet penetration into the mineral-rich Congo, a country that bordered nine others in the heart of Africa, caused intense worry in Washington.
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Although the Cold War framed and limited acceptable protest in the United States, it also provided an opening for civil rights activists to argue that America's image would suffer as long as racial discrimination persisted. Civil rights leaders became adept at pressing their agenda using the language and concerns of the day. When African American leaders sought government action on African issues, they typically couched their efforts in Cold War language. As aasf expanded its airlift efforts, it gave more prominence to the language of the Cold War. Belafonte, Poitier, and Robinson announced the goal for the 1960 academic year: to raise $121,000 to bring 243 students from Kenya primarily, but also Nyasaland (now Malawi), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Uganda, and Tanganyika and Zanzibar (both now parts of Tanzania). Writing to Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Joseph C. Satterthwaite, aasf extolled the potential public relations gains for the United States, noting the "great and dramatically favorable response throughout all of Africa if it could be arranged so that the students were flown from Nairobi to New York in American Air Force planes." At a "negligible cost" the U.S. government would support legitimate African aspirations and needs and thereby "provide an answer, widely public and throughout the world, to the Soviet challenge in the coming struggle for Africa." powers' lead when it came to engaging Africa. Despite any number of educational, cultural, and aid programs supported by the government, Satterthwaite informed aasf that there was no basis for any branch of government to supply transportation to 243 African students.
30
Yet presidential campaign politics now began to influence events, as did persistent black American voices that sought more action on Africa, winning the continent an unaccustomed salience as the nation chose its leader. Repeatedly turned down at State, promoters of the airlift turned to Vice President Nixon, with his established interest in Africa and his explicit recommendation that the administration review African aid programs for their political influence. Jackie Robinson, now a newspaper columnist, civil rights advocate, and aasf board member, took the lead in trying to persuade the vice president.
That summer Robinson and Nixon stood at a crossroads in a relationship that had started when the two met at the 1952 Republican National Convention. Nixon eagerly sought Robinson's endorsement for his presidential campaign, knowing that the former ballplayer, having broken the color line in major league baseball, held a special place in the pantheon of black American heroes and remained black America's most visible icon. In the tight contest for president, Nixon believed that he needed support from black voters and that Robinson could help deliver it. Yet Robinson hesitated over which political party and candidate held the most promise for black Americans. Robinson's dilemma mirrored that of many African Americans who found much to criticize in both parties and both candidates. Most prominent African American leaders, celebrities, and newspapers backed the Democratic ticket, yet many black Americans still loyally supported the gop. The most influential institution in black America, the church, was filled with Protestant ministers who disliked Kennedy's Catholicism-and Martin Luther King Sr. gave prominent voice to that opinion (his son, citing his position as head of the sclc and as a civil rights leader, proclaimed a nonpartisan stance). The Atlanta Daily World, the city's black paper, and leading black Atlantans supported the Republican ticket, and Nixon ultimately carried the black vote in Atlanta. 32 Robinson had initially endorsed and campaigned for the candidate with the strongest civil rights record in either party, Democrat Hubert Humphrey. After Humphrey lost the nomination, Robinson remained unenthusiastic about Kennedy, and Nixon worked hard to win his trust. Robinson saw in Nixon a politician sympathetic to the campaign for civil rights, who might use his political clout on behalf of black Americans. He pressed the vice president for a stronger commitment to civil rights while Nixon tried to show he was a civil rights man without taking stands that might alienate conservative white southern voters. 33 Robinson's personal appeal to Nixon was deeply influenced by two major forces of the day: expanding links between black Americans and Africa and the global struggle 30 against white supremacy that was cresting even as American leaders focused on the struggle against Communism. As he sat down to write the vice president, the recent massacre of sixty-nine unarmed protesters by South African police at Sharpeville weighed heavily on Robinson's mind. Just days before he had chaired a conference that launched an effort to boycott South African goods, where he spoke of the worldwide struggle against race supremacy and racial inequality and his view that "the fight against Jim Crow here is part of the same struggle in South Africa." Robinson was by no means alone in his assessment. The Crisis, noting that Africans felt the same impatience with white supremacy, colonialism, exploitation, and discrimination as blacks in the United States, believed that the destinies of peoples on both sides of the Atlantic were coupled: "American Negroes take courage and hope from an independent Ghana and Guinea; revolts in the Congo stiffen the resolve of Africans in South Africa. Everywhere the colored peoples are resolved that the arrogance and the domination of whites must go." African American leaders, adroitly invoking the weight of the black American vote in the tight election, sought to use politicians' desire for that vote to advance their concerns about Africa. Yet even rallying Nixon to the cause by highlighting the urgency of their agenda for Africa did not bring the hoped-for progress. As in much U.S. policy making vis-à-vis Africa, seemingly nothing short of a full-bore crisis would prod the Eisenhower administration to action. Later in the summer such a crisis would be the upheaval in the Congo, which prompted Eisenhower's staff secretary Andrew Goodpaster to write to Secretary of State Christian Herter in September that "the Congo crisis points up one of the world's most urgent needs: The absence of trained and educated people to take over leadership and administration of the new African nations." Goodpaster noted Belgium's "outstandingly bad" record in failing to provide Congolese administrative personnel yet admitted that "the situation is highly critical everywhere" and that "the U.S. record to date in rising to the occasion has not been good." Goodpaster also recognized what had by 753 Black Voters, Africa, and the 1960 Presidential Campaign then become evident: the United States had been slow to act "in spite of the fact that we have an asset few other nations, willing and able in this great need, can match-our own large negro population and the efforts they are so anxious to make in this regard." 38 Yet in mid-July, with the Congo crisis just a week old and the Eisenhower administration uncommitted to broadening its support of student exchanges, the State Department offered no funds to aasf. When Scheinman and Montero met on July 13 with State Department officials, three hours of dialogue produced the same answer as before: nothing could be done. Mere weeks remained before the start of the academic year, and airlift supporters worried that classes might begin with the students left waiting in Kenya. With a rising sense of panic, aasf leaders brought back Mboya, who made a personal appeal to a conference on African education convened by the Phelps-Stokes Fund. Nevertheless, the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller foundations and a long-standing supporter of educational exchanges, the Institute of International Education (iie), declined to offer any financial support. Hedging its bets and hoping to make the most of Mboya's limited time, the aasf also sought appointments with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Most declined. "After consulting with our State Department, which is not unaware of your problem, I have been advised that it does not look with favor on an airlift of foreign students at government expense," responded Senator Alexander Wiley. "Therefore, much as I approve of encouraging exchange of foreign students, I cannot be of assistance to the Foundation in this matter."
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Yet one senator accepted a meeting: Kennedy, who saw an opportunity to act on his interest in African education and student exchanges while bolstering at little cost a weak record on civil rights with a strong stance on African issues. Just one month earlier Kennedy had stood before the African diplomatic corps in Washington and repeated his desire to "greatly increase the number of African students-future African leaders-brought to this country for university training." The Kennedy campaign was also highlighting "the urgent need for program[s] of study for students from underdeveloped nations in the U.S. and educational assistance within underdeveloped nations." The campaign paper on educational exchanges cited depressing statistics: 80 percent adult illiteracy in Africa; fewer than one-third of school-aged children attending school; only 260,000 students on the continent enrolled in secondary school. Not only were current exchange programs inadequate, those that existed were terribly skewed. During the 1959-1960 school year, out of roughly 35,700 undergraduate and graduate students from underdeveloped nations studying in the United States, 4,780 were from Taiwan, while just 2 came from the Congo, where independence dawned with fewer than thirty Congolese university graduates in that vast territory and not a single Congolese medical doctor, lawyer, engineer, or army officer. 40 Kennedy understood that efforts to broaden opportunities for education resonated deeply with black Americans, who had long fought-and were still fighting-for equal access to and treatment in classrooms throughout the United States. had struggled to expand educational opportunity and to hold the nation to its avowed beliefs in uplift and equal opportunity. Now Kennedy had the chance to clear a way for Africans to study in the United States. That gesture would reverberate among black Americans, while few white voters would notice a few hundred African students enrolled in American colleges. Furthermore, the airlift offered a way to support Africa without explicitly engaging the controversial matter of exactly when African independence should come. That question was sensitive given concerns in Washington and the West over Africa's "readiness" for independence and its potential susceptibility to Communism-worries that intensified amidst the Congo's postindependence turmoil and Lumumba's turn to the Soviets for assistance. British success in portraying Kenyan fighters in the Mau Mau war as atavistic terrorists sowed fears about whether Kenya in particular was ready for self-governance. Education, however, provided a balm for all ills, one that Americans instinctively support and that even hard-line whites in Kenya were advocating, albeit as a way to delay the coming of independence. ate Foreign Relations subcommittee on Africa to intercede with the State Department. Kennedy said that if the vice president had tried that tack and failed, he could do little more there. But the senator suggested that the Joseph P. Kennedy Jr. Foundation, set up by his family, might be able to help. He telephoned Sargent Shriver, its executive director as well as the liaison between the Kennedy campaign's central operations and its civil rights section. After a brief conversation, Kennedy secured $5,000 and the promise that the foundation would seek to secure the rest of the funds from other potential donors.
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These events, while fortunate for the African students, marked a curious turn for Kennedy and the foundation. Established in 1946 in memory of the senator's oldest brother, who was killed during World War II, the foundation had as its mission, in the words of Senator Kennedy, "building and aiding schools and hospitals for underprivileged and handicapped children." That cause, dear to the Kennedy family largely because of the difficulties of John's retarded younger sister, Rosemary, became a way for Kennedy to handle regular pleas for help from people throughout the world who knew of his family wealth and political standing. He gently turned aside inquiries with the reply that he channeled his available funds through the foundation, sometimes adding that the foundation did not give grants to private individuals or that its work focused on the United States. Thus, when P. A. Mainardi of Naples, Italy, asked for assistance in February 1960 for an institution dedicated to the upbringing and education of poor boys, Kennedy regretted that his available money went to the foundation and its work with underprivileged and handicapped children in America. "Any exception," added Kennedy, "would be setting a precedent which the Foundation simply could not justify." Limited foundation funds meant that many worthy projects could not be funded. When Dean John C. Snyder of Harvard's School of Public Health solicited financial support for the creation of a residential international house for the school's students from around the world and their families, Kennedy supplied the name of the appropriate person to contact but warned that the foundation was "entering the research phase of its work with retarded children and is not making any new commitments at this time." 43 Despite the seeming limitations, five months later Kennedy managed in a five-minute phone call to secure a commitment for $5,000 from the foundation to help pay for 280 African students to fly to the United States. Further, when Shriver made no progress in getting other foundations to commit money immediately, Kennedy told him that, in his opinion as a trustee, the foundation should fund the whole project. Within a fortnight the foundation pledged $100,000 for the transport of three planeloads of African students, and on Friday, August 12, Shriver arranged to meet Montero and Scheinman the following Monday afternoon to wrap up details. Kennedy and the foundation asked one thing in return: that word of the funding be kept quiet, so as not to politicize the support. 44 In the heated atmosphere of the presidential campaign little remained quiet, nor did Kennedy really want it to. News spread as soon as aasf board members learned that funding for the airlift had been secured, for Robinson and the Nixon campaign remained in contact as the baseball hero inched toward his public endorsement. On Saturday, August 46 Tuesday morning Senator Scott rushed to herald the State Department's decision to finance "Airlift-Africa 1960." The problem for Scott, a staunch Nixon campaigner and later the Senate Republican leader, was that aasf leaders had decided to accept the Kennedy Foundation grant-news not unknown to the Nixon people. During the frenetic weekend Shepley had repeatedly phoned Montero, with his last phone call early Monday afternoon-barely an hour before Montero was to meet with Shriver-confirming that the government would provide $100,000 for the airlift. Shepley had pressed aasf to commit in return, but Montero and Scheinman chose to stay with the partner who brought them to the dance, informing Shepley and Thayer that they remained committed to the previous Kennedy Foundation pledge. 47 Accusations and counteraccusations fueled the ensuing political melee. Hearing of Scott's announcement, Montero and Scheinman sought out Robinson, whom they believed to be the source of the leak. But Robinson, on the verge of publicly endorsing Nixon, refused to change his Wednesday column for the New York Post that praised Nixon, Dillon, and Shepley for coming through with the grant. Montero and Scheinman responded with widely disseminated telegrams explaining that they had secured private financing only after the State Department had repeatedly rejected them, that they regretted Senator Scott's effort to reap political advantage from this nonpolitical education program, and that they hoped State would use the money offered to aasf for additional African students. Congressman Diggs weighed in with his own statement accusing the State Department of playing politics. 48 Black Voters, Africa, and the 1960 Presidential Campaign Senator Scott, firing back, strode onto the Senate floor Wednesday afternoon and raised the stakes. "The long arm of the family of the junior senator from Massachusetts," Scott charged, "has reached out and attempted to pluck this project from the United States Government." Scott questioned the decision of aasf to accept the private foundation's grant but expressed empathy; he could, he said, "understand the pressures brought about by the Kennedy people and their anxiety to take over the function of the Government in advance of an election." Cognizant that charges of a constitutional conspiracy might not stick, Scott questioned as well "the apparent misuse of tax-exempt foundation money for blatant political purposes." 49 Kennedy demanded the floor, calling Scott's statement "the most unfair, distorted, and malignant attack I have heard in fourteen years in politics." Kennedy defended the foundation's role in the airlift, emphasizing that it had not sought the part but that when asked for help, "we felt something ought to be done. To waste 250 scholarships in this country, to waste $200,000 these people had raised, to disappoint 250 students who hoped to come to this country, it certainly seemed to me, would be most unfortunate, and so we went ahead." Noting that many more African students needed assistance, Kennedy recommended that "the $100,000 Mr. Shepley was able to get from the State Department" be put to that good use.
50
At that point Arkansas senator J. William Fulbright, the Democratic chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, entered the fray. This long-standing supporter of international exchanges lamented his own "great difficulty" in obtaining funds, any funds, from the State Department the previous year to bring students from Cairo and demanded to know who Shepley was and how he had been able to convince the State Department to reverse its decision. Fulbright demanded that Secretary of State Herter answer that and a dozen other questions about what actions the department had taken, when, and why. State immediately began to justify its change of policy, confirming that the original aasf request had been denied but that after the aasf gave assurances regarding State's objections-that the airlift was confined to Kenyan students, that the project should have been done through iie, that there was inadequate provision for the students' expenses in the United States-the department signed off on the request. Of course, that such conditions never had been spelled out and thus never could have been met remained difficult for State to explain. Nor could State provide details on just where the $100,000 was coming from, even as it assured Fulbright that the funds were "legally available." Fulbright acidly chastised State for being susceptible to outside pressures-especially, he added, when trying to spend public money in lieu of private money.
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Framing an Appeal: "We Can Do Better"
Using the holy grail of votes, black leaders were able to move both the private and public realms to act on their objectives and get the African students to America. And in black America, the not-so-silent witnesses to this drama found themselves enjoying the sight of presidential candidates jockeying for their support. "One of Nixon's henchmen showed Kennedy, whose campaign worked with and advertised in the black press much more than Nixon's, knew that word of his support for Africa would inevitably find its way into the news, and he hoped, as Robinson and other black leaders argued, that it would create a political payoff with black voters such as Emmett Marshall. Nixon just as clearly feared that scenario, hence the frantic efforts to maneuver credit for supporting the airlift away from the Kennedy Foundation and to the State Department. When the efforts failed, the Nixon campaign tried to raise doubts about the integrity of Kennedy's involvement in order to undercut the way the episode was playing out in the black community. After working to that end on the floor of the Senate, Scott tried a venue far from his normal channels: the pages of the black press. His interest in the project, Scott wrote to the New York Amsterdam News, had begun months previously when he was having dinner with Jackie Robinson, and his recent statements were meant, not to devalue the airlift, but to question Kennedy's political maneuvering. Fully supportive of the opportunity for these Africans, Scott wanted to assure all that "[my] interest in helping to bring students here from Africa will continue, as will my efforts in connection with civil rights legislation." 53 The intertwining of the two-Africa and the civil rights agenda-revealed a profound reality of the day: Black men and women in America believed someone's commitment to black freedom and progress in Africa reflected his or her commitment to racial progress in America. Accusations that Kennedy forces pressured the aasf and "outbid" the State Department make sense given the importance of Africa to black America in the summer of 1960. As the wave of independence that seemed to sweep from one African country to another turned 1960 into "The Year of Africa," stories, editorials, and letters about an emerging black Africa filled the pages of the black press. Africa and civil rights dominated the hard news coverage, and the issues were linked. "We dark-skinned Americans are understandably emotional in our attitudes toward the black nations of Africa-past, present, and future," remarked Lester Granger of the Urban League. "Colonialism, whether it be of the brutally exploitative or the suavely manipulative type, is abhorrent to us; we equate it with racial segregation in this country." 54 A number of broad concerns were on African American minds when it came to Africa: the end of white minority rule and support for African independence; economic and development assistance; and a greater voice in formulating and implementing U.S. policy on Africa. African American leaders saw themselves as having a special role to play in the United States in regard to Africa, from working to end discriminatory treatment against the steadily increasing number of African diplomats coming to the United States to securing places for more black Americans as Foreign Service officers. "As Americans deeply committed to the United Nations and as citizens with more than ordinary interest in the democratic independence of the African nations," naacp executive secretary Roy Wilkins wrote to the un secretary general, Dag Hammarskjold, in early October, naacp members and leaders were "greatly concerned" about the discrimination faced by Africans who journeyed to New York. Wilkins offered the naacp's services in helping address the situation, for "the reciprocal impact of their [Africans'] fight for independence and our fight for equality in this country, together with the many analogies arising therefrom, puts us in a unique position to be of assistance in the present case." 55 Indeed, efforts were already underway to create an organization by, of, and for black Americans to influence policy toward Africa. Within two years, the major civil rights leaders would join in calling on the broad spectrum of black Americans to form an organization to lobby in behalf of African causes and interests. "The American Negro community in the U.S. has a special responsibility to urge a dynamic policy on our own country," wrote Martin Luther King, A. Philip Randolph, Roy Wilkins, James Farmer of the Congress of Racial Equality, Dorothy Height of the National Council of Negro Women, and Whitney Young of the Urban League. "Although we have a serious civil rights problem which exhausts much of our energy, we cannot separate the struggle at home from that abroad." 56 The transnational links pointed to by black American leaders offered Democrats an opportunity to invoke Africa in an oblique play for the black vote without even further loosening their increasingly precarious hold on white southern voters. Kennedy in particular pursued the connection: during the final three months of the campaign he referred to Africa an eye-opening 167 times in his speeches and statements. In contrast, Nixon did so 23 times. The stark contrast was paralleled, albeit less frequently, when the topic was Asia: Kennedy raised it 82 times; Nixon did so 15 times. Vietnam was not yet an issue, and Asia did not speak to black voters as did Africa. While the lack of detailed opinion polling makes it impossible to gauge why individual African Americans cast their ballots as they did, we can see what Kennedy perceived and emphasized. 57 
